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Essays on socially optimal phosphorus 
policies in crop production
Antti Iho
MTT Economic Research, Latokartanonkaari 9, FI-00790 Helsinki 
antti.iho@mtt.fi 
is considered in the thesis, as well as its 
mitigation  by  constructing  vegetative 
buffers.
The dynamic model is applied for cereal 
production on clay soils. At the steady 
state, the analysis focuses on the effects of 
prices, damage parameterization, discount 
rate and soil phosphorus carryover capacity 
on optimal steady state phosphorus use. 
The  economic  instruments  needed  to 
sustain  the  social  optimum  are  also 
analyzed.  According  to  the  results  the 
economic incentives should be conditioned 
on soil phosphorus values directly, rather 
than on annual phosphorus applications. 
The results also emphasize the substantial 
effects the differences in varying discount 
rates of the farmer and the social planner 
have on optimal instruments.
The  thesis  analyzes  the  optimal  soil 
phosphorus  paths  from  its  alternative 
initial levels. It also examines how erosion 
susceptibility of a parcel affects these optimal 
paths. The results underline the significance 
of the prevailing soil phosphorus status 
on optimal fertilization levels. With very 
high initial soil phosphorus levels, both the 
privately and socially optimal phosphorus 
application levels are close to zero as the 
Abstract
P
hosphorus is a nutrient needed in 
crop  production. While  boosting 
crop yields it may also accelerate 
eutrophication  in  the  surface  waters 
receiving the phosphorus runoff.
The privately optimal level of phosphorus 
use is determined by the input and output 
prices, and the crop response to phosphorus. 
Socially optimal use also takes into account 
the impact of phosphorus runoff on water 
quality. Increased eutrophication decreases 
the economic value of surface waters by 
deteriorating  fish  stocks,  curtailing  the 
potential for recreational activities and by 
increasing the probabilities of mass algae 
blooms.
In this dissertation, the optimal use of 
phosphorus  is  modelled  as  a  dynamic 
optimization  problem.  The  potentially 
plant available phosphorus accumulated 
in soil is treated as a dynamic state variable, 
the  control  variable  being  the  annual 
phosphorus fertilization. For crop response 
to phosphorus, the state variable is more 
important than the annual fertilization. 
The level of this state variable is also a key 
determinant of the runoff of dissolved, 
reactive  phosphorus.  Also  the  loss  of 
particulate  phosphorus  due  to  erosion 4  MTT SCIENCE 13
state variable is driven towards its steady 
state. The soil phosphorus processes are 
slow. Therefore, depleting high phosphorus 
soils may take decades. 
The thesis also presents a methodologically 
interesting phenomenon in problems of 
maximizing the flow of discounted payoffs. 
When both the benefits and damages are 
related to the same state variable, the steady 
state  solution  may  have  an  interesting 
property, under very general conditions: 
The tail of the payoffs of the privately 
optimal path – as well as the steady state 
– may provide a higher social welfare than 
the respective tail of the socially optimal 
path. The result is formalized and applied 
to  the  created  framework  of  optimal 
phosphorus use. 
Key words:
Phosphorus fertilization, soil 
phosphorus, phosphorus runoff, 
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Esseitä yhteiskunnallisesti 
optimaalisesta fosforinkäytöstä 
viljanviljelyssä
Antti Iho
MTT Taloustutkimus, Latokartanonkaari 9, 00790 Helsinki 
antti.iho@mtt.fi 
Tiivistelmä
F
osfori on kasvintuotannon kannalta 
välttämätön ravinne. Se lisää satoja 
mutta tuotantoalueen alapuolisissa 
vesistöissä sen huuhtoutuminen voi kiih-
dyttää rehevöitymistä. 
Yksityistaloudellisesti järkevä fosforinkäy-
tön taso määräytyy fosforin hinnan, sen 
satovaikutuksen  ja  lopputuotteen  hin-
nan perusteella. Yhteiskunnallisesti järke-
vää tasoa määriteltäessä tulee tämän lisäksi 
ottaa huomioon fosforihuuhtoumien vai-
kutus  rehevöitymiseen  ja  sen  kielteiset 
hyvinvointivaikutukset  kuten  heikenty-
neet virkistyskäyttömahdollisuudet, kala-
kantojen muutokset ja massaleväkukinto-
jen todennäköisyyksien kasvaminen.
Tässä  väitöskirjassa  luodaan  viitekehys 
fosforinkäytön järkevän tason määritte-
lemiseen niin yksityis- kuin yhteiskunta-
taloudelliselta kannalta. Luodun mallin 
tilamuuttujana on maaperään kertynyt, 
kasveille  potentiaalisesti  käyttökelpoi-
nen fosforivaranto, jonka tasoa voidaan 
hitaasti ohjata vuotuisella fosforilannoi-
tuksella. Tämä maaperän fosfori on sadon 
kannalta varsinaista fosforilannoitusta mer-
kittävämpi komponentti. Liukoisen, välit-
tömästi  kasveille  käyttökelpoisen  fosfo-
rin huuhtouma on niinikään sidoksissa 
tähän fosfori  varantoon. Mallilla ratkais-
taan myös, kuinka eroosioherkkyydestä 
riippuvan hiukkasmaisen fosforin joutu-
mista vesistöihin tulisi torjua vesistöjen 
varteen perustettavin suojakaistoin.
Mallia  sovelletaan  savimailla  viljeltävän 
ohran  fosforilannoituksen  tarkasteluun. 
Mallin avulla tarkastellaan hintojen, hai-
tan  arvostuksen  ja  maaperän  fosfori-
dynamiikan vaikutuksia järkevään pitkän 
aika  välin fosforinkäyttöön. Lisäksi analy-
soidaan optimi  ratkaisua tukevien taloudel-
listen ohjauskeinojen asetantaa. Tulosten 
mukaan ohjauksen kannattaisi perustua 
suoraan maaperän fosforitasoon vuotuisen 
lannoitusmäärän asemesta. Toisaalta tulos-
ten mukaan viljelijän ja yhteiskunnan toi-
sistaan poikkeavat diskonttokorot vaikutta-
vat ohjauskeinojen tasoon merkittävästi. 
Työssä selvitetään myös, miten fosfori-
varanto kannattaa ohjata kohti pitkän aika-
välin tasapainoa eri lähtötasoilta lähdettä-
essä. Samoin selvitetään, miten optimaaliset 
polut kohti tasapainoa riippuvat tarkastel-
tavan lohkon eroosioherkkyydestä. Fosfori-
varannon lähtötason vaikutus optimaalisiin 
polkuihin on merkittävä. Korkeimmilta 
lähtötasoilta lähdettäessä optimaaliset polut 
pyrkivät pudottamaan varantoja erittäin 6  MTT SCIENCE 13
Avainsanat:
Fosforilannoitus, maaperän fosfori­
varanto, fosforihuuhtouma, 
dynaaminen ohjelmointi
nopeasti kohti tasapainoa. Maaperäproses-
sit ovat kuitenkin erittäin hitaita ja fosfori-
varannon köyhdyttäminen voi kestää kym-
meniä vuosia. 
Tutkimus nostaa esille myös menetelmäl-
lisesti mielenkiintoisen ilmiön diskontat-
tujen hyötyjen summan maksimointiin 
perustuvassa  optimointitehtävässä.  Kun 
hyöty ja haitta linkittyvät samaan dynaa-
miseen tilamuuttujaan, tasapainoratkai-
sulla voi varsin tavallisten ehtojen vallitessa 
olla yllättävä ominaisuus: yksityistaloudel-
lisen optimipolun loppuosa – pitkän ajan 
tasapaino mukaan lukien – voi tietystä 
ajanhetkestä eteenpäin tuottaa suurempaa 
yhteiskunnallista hyötyä kuin yhteiskun-
nallisesti optimaalinen polku. Työssä for-
malisoidaan tämä ilmiö ja tarkastellaan sen 
ilmenemistä.   MTT SCIENCE 13   7
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Phosphorus as an economic problem 1 
P
hosphorus is a nutrient required in 
crop production. In surface waters, 
however, elevated phosphorus con-
centrations may have adverse effects on hu-
man welfare. Where high levels of phos-
phorus cause the phytoplankton biomass to 
increase, this may combine with other eu-
trophication mechanisms to increase turbid-
ity, heighten the probability of mass algae 
blooms,  reduce biodiversity and introduce 
toxic substances.
In inland lakes and rivers, phosphorus is 
most often the limiting nutrient for prima-
ry production. Phosphorus losses from ag-
riculture are substantial: their share of an-
thropogenic phosphorus loads into the Baltic 
Sea, for instance, is estimated to be as high 
as 57 percent (Helcom 2004). Phospho-
rus has a twofold influence on social wel-
fare: It increases welfare by elevating crop 
production, and decreases it by accelerating 
eutrophication.
Perspective: the private  1.1 
farmer
Phosphorus  affects  crop  growth  mainly 
through potentially plant available phos-
phorus accumulated in soil (hereinafter ‘soil 
phosphorus’). The level of soil phosphorus is 
gradually determined by annual phosphorus 
balances, i.e. the differences between phos-
phorus application and crop uptake. Hence, 
the farmer’s use of phosphorus is best mod-
eled as a dynamic programming problem 
where amount of phosphorus applied is the 
control variable and soil phosphorus the 
state variable. 
Consider a farmer maximizing the sum of 
discounted per period profits (π) from crop 
production (y) over an infinite time hori-
zon by choosing fertilization (x) at each pe-
riod. Fertilization affects the following pe-
riod’s soil phosphorus (s) according to the 
transition function (Γ), and production is a 
function of fertilization and soil phosphorus. 
Normalizing prices to one and assuming oth-
er costs to be zero, the problem becomes:
 
[ ] 1
0
max ( , )       ..    (,),
t
t
t t t t t t x
t
ysx xst s s x β
∞
+
=
− = Γ ∑
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[ ] 1
0
max ( , )       ..    (,),
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+
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where the discount factor (β) is derived from 
the discount rate (r) by the equation  1
1 r
β =
+
. 
The optimality conditions for (1) are derived 
from the steady-state Bellman equation:
  [ ] () max ( ,) (( ,) )
x Vs sx V s x π β = + Γ ,    ,  (2)
where V represents a value function. At the 
steady state, the choice and the state varia-
bles are unchanged between periods. The op-
timality conditions consist of a Euler equa-
tion and a stationary condition:
 
  ( ,)(1 ( , ) ) ( , ) ( ,) 0 x s x s s x s x s x s x π β β π
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −Γ +Γ =
 
   (3)
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  ( ) 1 0
(1 )
s
x x
s
y
y β
β
⇔ − +Γ =
−Γ
 
  (4)
 
 
( ,). s s x
∗ ∗ ∗ =Γ   (5)
At the optimum, the farmer balances the 
marginal effects of phosphorus fertilization 
on current period profits ( 1 x x y π = − )  and 
discounted future profits, the second term in 
(4). The (imputed) value of a marginal unit 
of soil phosphorus is 
(1 )
s
s
y
β −Γ
  . It is the sum 
of an infinite geometric sequence of profits 
generated  by  a  marginal  increase  in  s 
( ( )
2 ... s s s s s y y y β β +Γ + Γ + )   . This increase, for 
its part, is generated by the marginal effect 
of x on s (Γx). The value is realized in the fol-
lowing period and is thus discounted once.   MTT SCIENCE 13   11
Assuming ys , yx , Γx, Γs > 0; yss , yxx < 0, 
the second term in (4) is positive. There-
fore, the marginal profits (πx) must be 
negative. 
Perspective: the social  1.2 
planner 
Phosphorus runoff from agricultural pro-
duction may deteriorate the water quality 
of surface waters. Where this is the case, 
the social planner’s task is either to pro-
vide a certain level of environmental qual-
ity at the least possible cost or to maximize 
social welfare. 
If we assume that farmers are price takers, 
social welfare can be expressed as a sum of 
private profits less the monetarized value of 
environmental damage. The simplest way 
to formulate the social planner’s problem 
here – welfare maximization over an infi-
nite horizon – is to introduce a term to the 
private problem (1) representing damage 
as a flow. Denoting environmental dam-
age by D(s,x), the social planner’s prob-
lem becomes: 
  [ ] 1
0
max ( , ) (,)       ..    (,).
t
t
t t t t t t t x
t
s x D sx st s s x β π
∞
+
=
− = Γ ∑
 
[ ] 1
0
max ( , ) (,)       ..    (,).
t
t
t t t t t t t x
t
s x D sx st s s x β π
∞
+
=
− = Γ ∑
  (6)
 
Analogously to equation (4), the social 
planner’s optimality condition becomes:
  ( ) ( )
1 0 .
(1 )
s s
x x x
s
y D
y D β
β
−
−− +Γ =
−Γ
 
( ) ( )
1 0 .
(1 )
s s
x x x
s
y D
y D β
β
−
−− +Γ =
−Γ
  (7)
Assume that Dx, Ds ≥ 0. We can trace the 
effects of introducing the environmental 
damage function with the following rea-
soning: First, assume Dx = 0 and Ds > 0. 
This would make the second term in (7) 
smaller than that in (4), with (yx  – 1) then 
becoming a smaller negative number; that 
is, yx would become larger. Given yxx < 0, 
this would lower fertilization at the op-
timum. Then assume Ds = 0 and Dx > 0. 
Again, this would require increasing yx, i.e. 
decreasing fertilization. That is, at the so-
cially optimal steady state there will be less 
fertilizer applied than at the private opti-
mum. Whether more or less fertilizer will 
be applied in a socially optimal dynamic 
steady state than in a static private opti-
mum depends on the parameterization of 
the functions.
The social planner’s goal may also be the 
cost-effectiveness of environmental pro-
tection, that is, achieving a given level of 
environmental quality at the lowest possi-
ble cost. Maximizing social welfare implies 
cost-effectiveness: A policy that maximiz-
es welfare also achieves the associated en-
vironmental quality with the least possible 
costs. If not, it would be possible to in-
crease welfare by lowering costs and main-
taining the environmental quality. In this 
sense, welfare maximization is a stronger 
concept than cost-effectiveness. Neverthe-
less, there are cases and research questions 
for which cost-effectiveness is a more suit-
able concept than welfare maximization. 
Firstly, the social planner might be unable 
to specify the social damage function. Sec-
ondly, one might want to focus the analy-
sis – perhaps an empirical inquiry – on is-
sues such as the efficiency of environmental 
protection under spatial heterogeneity. In 
certain circumstances, focusing on cost-ef-
fectiveness instead of welfare maximization 
increases the tractability of the analysis.
To illustrate cost-effectiveness with a sim-
ple analysis, suppose that the dynamic ele-
ment in our phosphorus problem is negli-
gible. The social planner’s problem would 
then be to maximize the welfare of a single 
period. However, suppose that the damage 
depends on the sum of phosphorus losses 
(L) from N parcels with differing runoff 
characteristics. Further, suppose that the 
phosphorus loss could be mitigated with 
active measures, for instance, construct-
ing vegetative filter strips (b) on field edg-12  MTT SCIENCE 13
es bordering water bodies. Setting the tar-
get level of total phosphorus runoff from 
N parcels to L   , the social planner’s prob-
lem could be formulated as:
 
,
1 1
max ( , )       ..    (,) .
i i
N N
i i i i xb
i i
x b s t L xb L π
= =
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,
1 1
max ( , )       ..    (,) .
i i
N N
i i i i xb
i i
x b s t L xb L π
= =
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  (8) 
Assuming strict equalities and no cross-ef-
fects in runoff yields the following first or-
der conditions: 
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∂ ∂ 
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
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The upper condition implies that at the 
cost-efficient solution the ratio of margin-
al profits and marginal effects on phos-
phorus loss (i.e. marginal abatement costs) 
must be equal across all parcels and both 
measures. Intuitively, this means that the 
last units of money should be used such 
that the abatement achieved is equal eve-
rywhere, and with both alternative meas-
ures. If the last euro spent at parcel j would 
provide smaller effects on phosphorus loss 
than at parcel k, it should be spent at k in-
stead of j. The lower condition guarantees 
that the constraint on total phosphorus 
loss is satisfied. 
In practice, the need to vary phosphorus 
application levels and the construction of 
vegetative filter strips across parcels de-
pends on the heterogeneity of the target 
region. For example, if there are substantial 
differences in erosion susceptibility, strips 
will probably be concentrated on the par-
cels most susceptible to erosion. If, on the 
other hand, parcels are homogeneous, the 
optimal allocation of strips will be identi-
cal everywhere.
Literature review  2 
Phosphorus in crop  2.1 
production
In broad terms, there are two alternative 
ways to model crop response to nutri-
ent inputs. A linear response and plateau 
(LRP) model assumes that crop response 
is linear with respect to the limiting nu-
trient. Increasing the supply of that nutri-
ent increases the crop yield linearly until 
some other nutrient becomes limiting. Af-
ter this point, adding the nutrient does not 
increase the crop yield (see, e.g., Grimm et 
al. 1987). An alternative way is to estimate 
the response as a smooth concave func-
tion (see, e.g., Hurley et al. 2004). This ap-
proach allows for substitution between nu-
trients. The analysis by Berck and Helfand 
(1990) shows that these two approaches are 
not necessarily conflicting ones. In fact, us-
ing LRP functions but allowing for heter-
ogeneity in input use makes it possible to 
estimate the aggregate-level response as a 
concave function. Given this bridge be-
tween the approaches and the analytical 
convenience of concave response functions, 
the use of these functions in aggregate-level 
policy analysis seems well motivated. For 
example, Myyrä et al. (2007) estimate the 
responses to both soil phosphorus and 
phosphorus application using a concave 
response function.   MTT SCIENCE 13   13
Phosphorus runoff 2.2 
The water-soluble forms of phosphorus in 
soil may end up in runoff waters in the 
form of dissolved phosphorus (DP). They 
can also be sorbed back into soil constitu-
ents, after which they are classified as in-
soluble. Insoluble phosphorus may be car-
ried into receiving waters with erosion, 
for example, when soil particles are de-
tached from fields. This type of phospho-
rus in runoff is called particulate phospho-
rus (PP).
DP contributes directly to the phosphorus 
concentration of the receiving water body, 
where it is eventually assimilated as biotic 
phosphorus or sorbed into sediments. DP 
loss is strongly correlated  with the level of 
soil phosphorus (McDowell and Sharp-
ley 2001; Vadas et al. 2005; Ekholm et al. 
2005). Schroeder et al. (2004) list the stud-
ies examining the relationship between soil 
phosphorus and DP loss in runoff.1
PP, on the other hand, must be desorbed 
before it becomes available for primary 
production in receiving waters. As some 
PP is deposited into sediments before des-
orption, only a proportion of total PP can 
be regarded as potentially bioavailable (see, 
e.g., Ekholm 1998; Uusitalo et al. 2003). 
The determinants of PP loss are mainly 
those governing erosion: the amount and 
timing of rainfall, soil type, stability of soil 
structure, cultivation technology, and crop 
choice. Field slope is a central determinant 
of erosion (Wischmeier and Smith 1978). 
Eventual PP loss is determined by the total 
phosphorus concentration of soil lost with 
eroded particles. 
Vegetative filter strips are often used to re-
duce the risk of erosion and filter nutrients 
from surface runoff (see Dosskey 2002 for 
a review of studies on the abatement effects 
of filter strips). The strips mainly filter PP 
from surface runoff. Their effect on DP 
loss is ambiguous: they have been found 
to decrease it (Schmitt et al. 1999; Lee et 
al. 2000) and to increase it (Uusi-Kämppä 
and Kilpinen 2000). Dillaha et al. (1989) 
find increasing effects in some individual 
experiments, decreasing in others. A sim-
ple way to reduce DP loss is to lower the 
soil phosphorus level. The two major dif-
ferences between these two ways to miti-
gate phosphorus loss is that lowering soil 
phosphorus is more time consuming than 
constructing filter strips and that mitigat-
ing erosion primarily reduces the loss of 
particulate phosphorus, the environmen-
tal damage attributable to which is small-
er than its share in total phosphorus loss 
(in kilograms) indicates.
Not only the load from pollution sources, 
but also the retention of phosphorus affects 
efficient phosphorus policies. Retention is 
usually defined as the difference between 
the phosphorus input to the lake (or oth-
er water body) and output from the lake. 
The mass balance models find the reten-
tion of total phosphorus to be correlated 
with, for instance, the phosphorus concen-
tration, and the volume, the mean depth 
and the water renewal time of the lake (see, 
e.g., Vollenweider 1975; Frisk 1981). Frisk 
(1989) emphasizes that the retention mod-
els are lake-specific and not universal. 
Quantifying phosphorus retention is dif-
ficult. Firstly, the material balance models 
need to be empirically specified for each 
lake. Secondly, it seems that most retention 
models available in literature focus on to-
tal phosphorus concentrations. In econom-
ic models, however, it is justified to use 
algal-available phosphorus as a state varia-
1 Naturally, soil phosphorus is not the only factor in-
fluencing DP loss. By modeling DP loss as a func-
tion of soil phosphorus only, one neglects, for in-
stance, the influence of soil-to-solution ratios and 
the amount and the saturation rate of oxides in soil 
(see, e.g., Sharpley et al. 1981 and Yli-Halla et al. 
1995). However, soil phosphorus is a readily avail-
able measure.14  MTT SCIENCE 13
ble. It is driving eutrophication and hence 
the economic losses related to phospho-
rus runoff. It’s share of total phosphorus is 
small (see, e.g., Frisk 1989; Uusitalo et al. 
2003). Furthermore, the sediment process-
es driving the binding and release of phos-
phates are extremely complicated (see, e.g., 
Lehto  ranta et al. 2008). Scarcity of data 
needed to model individual basins would 
make the task even more complicated.
On a general level, the economics of re-
gional pollution control are well under-
stood and documented in environmental 
economic literature (see, e.g., Xepapadeas 
1997, pp 55–56). Phosphorus runoff oc-
curing  from  sources  near  the  recipient 
should be treated more harshly than those 
in far distance, given that one takes into 
account only the environmental quality at 
the receiving water body. Analytically, this 
would mean adding an individual trans-
port coefficient for each parcel in condi-
tions (9), describing the share of pollution 
eventually entering the receptor. In this 
case, optimality conditions would require 
that costs from an incremental increase in 
abatement at the receptor point are identical 
across all parcels/pollution sources. 
To keep the analyses tractable, all articles 
in this thesis ignore the effect of phospho-
rus retention. If spatial data regarding re-
tention were available, it would be justified 
to use it when giving targeted policy rec-
ommendations for a given lake or reservoir. 
Here, however, it can be ignored without 
loss of generality.
Damage from  2.3 
eutrophication
There are two central aspects of the eco-
nomic damage from eutrophication of sur-
face waters due to external phosphorus (or 
nitrogen) loads. Firstly, the biological proc-
ess of eutrophication exhibits nonconvexi-
ties, mainly due to potential internal phos-
phorus loads. Assume, for instance, that an 
increase in external phosphorus loads by a 
ton per year increases the level of eutroph-
ication by a certain amount. Nonconvex-
ity in eutrophication would mean that re-
ducing the external load back to its original 
level would not bring the eutrophication to 
its original level. Bringing the water body 
back to its initial state would require re-
ducing external loads by more than a ton 
per year. The economics of such a dynam-
ic system, often linked to shallow lakes, 
have been described in the seminal article 
by Mäler et al. (2003). In a short period 
of time, the article has inspired an entire   
thread of literature related to nonconvexi-
ties of dynamic systems and their implica-
tions for economic decision making.
Secondly, it is often assumed that the dis-
utility from eutrophication increases the 
faster the higher the level of eutrophica-
tion. That is, the damage function is as-
sumed to be convex. To illustrate, assume 
that Secchi depth, which indicates the tur-
bidity of water, were the indicator (fully) 
correlated with the negative effects of eu-
trophication. It is rather intuitive to as-
sume that people would be willing to pay 
more for an increase in Secchi depth from 
one meter to two than for an increase from 
ten meters to eleven. 
On balance, the external phosphorus load 
has a different value of disutility depend-
ing on the status of the hydrological sys-
tem receiving the pollution and people’s 
willingness to pay for a particular envi-
ronmental state of the system. However, 
one is able to incorporate these features 
in the economic analysis only if one con-
siders all sources of external phosphorus 
in the (dynamic) optimization model. Of 
course, one must also be able to describe 
the hydrological development of the sys-
tem with regard to both internal and exter-
nal phosphorus loads. If one wants to an-
alyze a single industry that is polluting a 
water body receiving pollution from other, 
multiple anthropogenic  sources, the only 
feasible damage function is a linear ap-
proximation that links the units of exter-  MTT SCIENCE 13   15
nal phosphorus load with a constant mon-
etary value. 2
Optimal phosphorus  2.4 
policies
Griffin and Bromley (1982) developed a 
conceptual framework describing the reg-
ulation of agricultural pollution. Their key 
contribution was to overcome the challeng-
es posed by the unobservability of non-
point pollution, or, rather, the difficulty of 
linking it with its source, which impedes 
the direct use of instruments suitable for 
observable point-source loads. Griffin and 
Bromley (1982) showed that the first-best 
solution can be achieved by using a con-
tinuously differentiable pollution produc-
tion function. This enables the regulator to 
use the traditional set of instruments. They 
also examined whether control should fo-
cus on the farmer’s actions or on the result-
ing nonpoint pollution using two regula-
tory approaches: incentives and quantity 
restrictions. Hence, they analyzed four dif-
ferent policy options, examples of which 
include: 1)  taxing estimated nutrient run-
off, 2) setting standards for nutrient run-
off, 3) taxing fertilization and 4) setting 
fertilization limits. They concluded that 
alternative policies can be applied equally 
efficiently if properly combined with the 
pollution production function.3 
This result was challenged by Shortle and 
Dunn (1986), who argued that the stochas-
ticity of nonpoint pollution, as well as in-
formation asymmetries between the regula-
tor and the farmer, influence the efficiency 
of alternative instruments. Acknowledg-
ing these, they found that incentivizing 
management practices (e.g., taxing ferti-
lization) is generally more favorable than 
the other three policy alternatives. Braden 
and Segerson (1993) list the basic prop-
erties of any instrument or variable upon 
which an instrument is based. Firstly, in-
struments should reflect the environmen-
tal conditions as accurately as possible. For 
instance, if the level of accumulated soil 
phosphorus correlates more strongly with 
phosphorus runoff than do annual phos-
phorus fertilization levels, it would be a 
better basis for a policy instrument. Sec-
ondly, the instruments should be enforce-
able on both the practical and political lev-
els. Thirdly, they should be spatially and 
temporally targetable. 
Griffin and Bromley (1982) also touched 
upon the temporal aspects of agricultur-
al policies. They noted that differences in 
discount rates of the private farmer and 
the social planner generate a temporal ex-
ternality. Because the choice of phospho-
rus fertilization is a dynamic programming 
problem, this externality will affect the dif-
ferences between privately and socially op-
timal phosphorus uses. To our knowledge, 
however, this issue has not been analyzed 
in the literature, although the dynamic 
character of phosphorus in agriculture has 
received attention. Schnitkey and Miranda 
(1993) analyze the optimal use of manure 
2  Consider  pollution  originating  from  multiple 
sources and the environmental damage at the re-
ceptor being convex. It is obvious  that focusing on a 
single source of pollution while keeping others fixed 
– i.e. equating its marginal abatement costs with 
marginal damage – yields higher abatement require-
ments for that source than would be the case under 
social optimum, where all pollution sources were 
able to abate. Only when other sources abate exact-
ly the socially optimal amount, the remaining source 
can be analyzed separately. Assume that the under-
lying damage function for, say, the Gulf of Finland 
would be convex. Maximizing social welfare from ag-
riculture net of its environmental damage using the 
parametrized convex damage function would overes-
timate the abatement requirements for agriculture. 
When focusing on a single industry, one must use a 
linear damage function approximation.
3 They noted that the number of parameters to be 
specified for the regulator varied from a single pa-
rameter (in the case of nonpoint incentive) to a pa-
rameter for each firm and production input (in the 
case of regulating management practices).16  MTT SCIENCE 13
and mineral fertilizer on farms that engage 
in  both animal husbandry and crop pro-
duction. They show how both the nutri-
ent ratios of manure and its hauling costs 
affect its optimal application rates. In this 
light, they go on to analyze how alterna-
tive policies would affect production choic-
es and the accumulation of nutrients. In 
their model, soil phosphorus is linked with 
crop production but not with phosphorus 
losses. Goetz and Zilberman (2000) deter-
mine spatially and intertemporally optimal 
phosphorus use (in the form of mineral fer-
tilizers and manure), the optimal number 
of animal units, and the optimal phospho-
rus concentration in the receiving body of 
water. The phosphorus loading potential 
of the parcels is defined by an index, fixed 
in time; that is, it does not evolve with the 
accumulation of soil phosphorus. Goetz 
and Keusch (2005) include crop rotation 
and tillage practices in their analysis. In 
their model, soil loss determines phospho-
rus loss. The links between soil phosphorus 
dynamics and losses of dissolved phospho-
rus are not acknowledged. 
Precision agriculture refers to production 
technology that utilizes information in-
tensively. It may refer to maximizing the 
utilization of inputs and hence minimiz-
ing residual inputs, which are the ultimate 
cause of agricultural pollution. Boosting 
utilization requires improving spatial in-
formation on, say, the nutrient stocks in 
and crop uptake of the soil. Understand-
ing the actual need for nutrient inputs 
for particular locations enables the farm-
er to target and differentiate fertilization 
rates between different parcels and even 
within parcels. However, as Lichtenberg 
(2002) points out, even if the farmer ac-
quired information on spatial heterogene-
ity and took it into account when deter-
mining his/her nutrient application rates, 
this would not necessarily increase social 
welfare. As long as the private farmer does 
not acknowledge environmental damage, 
adopting more precise fertilization practic-
es may in fact decrease social welfare. 
Khanna and Zilberman (1997) provide an 
interesting insight into precision technolo-
gies. They show that even though the tech-
nologies would be beneficial for private 
farmers, there are elements impeding their 
adoption. Firstly, the benefits of adopt-
ing such technologies are heterogeneous 
among farmers. Secondly, institutional el-
ements do not incentivize – and may even 
discourage – their adoption. Formal anal-
yses of precision agriculture are few and far 
between (Lichtenberg 2002). The second 
article in this thesis provides interesting 
qualitative results in this area of research.
Finally, there are numerous empirical stud-
ies on the impact of heterogeneity on opti-
mal policies. Typically, these studies com-
pare the use of either differentiated or 
uniform instruments to regulate agricul-
tural externalities generated in heterogene-
ous conditions. Helfand and House (1995) 
examined the efficiency of uniform regula-
tion on nitrate leaching in lettuce produc-
tion. Their results suggest that the efficien-
cy losses related to the use of second-best 
(uniform) regulation are fairly minor (up 
to 2% of the quasi-rents of production). 
Similar results were found by Fleming and 
Adams (1997), who examined control-
ling nitrates in groundwater. By contrast, 
Schwabe (2001) found a uniform strate-
gy to reduce nitrogen loads by 30% to be 
about 70% more costly than the least-cost 
alternative. These results emphasize that 
the more spatial differences there are in 
the production and nonpoint production 
function, the more is to be gained by us-
ing targeted policies.
Lichtenberg (2002) provides an extensive 
treatment of the optimal use of polluting 
inputs under heterogeneity. He postulates 
a model with a continuum of land types 
and a choice between two alternative crop 
choices/agricultural practices. The social-
ly optimal and the privately optimal solu-
tions differ with land quality.  MTT SCIENCE 13   17
Iho (2005) analyzes the cost-effectiveness 
of water protection measures as the target 
level of nutrients varies. In practice, envi-
ronmental targets may be set at very op-
timistic levels. For instance, the Finnish 
water protection targets until 2005 estab-
lished goals for phosphorus and nitrogen 
reduction of 45% and 40%, respectively 
(Vesiensuojelun tavoitteet vuoteen 2005 
1998). He constructs a scenario in which 
it is assumed that one could determine 
the cost-effective allocation of measures to 
achieve this target and that only an identi-
cal fraction (less than one) of each measure 
would actually be carried out. The analysis, 
carried out in the context of the European 
Union Water Framework Directive, indi-
cates how severely such downscaling of ef-
ficient allocations vitiates the efficiency of 
environmental protection.
Phosphorus in Finland 3 
Phosphorus in crop  3.1 
production
Phosphorus has a disputed role in Finn-
ish crop production. Even though the to-
tal content of phosphorus in soils may be 
high, the reserves are poorly available for 
plants. This is partly due to the high con-
tent of aluminum and iron oxides in soils, 
which form tight chemical bonds with 
phosphate anions (Kaila 1963a, 1963b). 
In mineral soils, the mean total phospho-
rus content (of topsoil) has increased from 
1.8 tons ha-1 in the 1930s to its current lev-
el of about 3 tons ha-1 (Saarela 2002). The 
application of phosphorus fertilization has 
not increased linearly over those decades. 
The average phosphorus surplus was 15 kg 
ha-1 in the 1960s, about 25 kg ha-1 in the 
1970s and 1980s, and about 10 kg ha-1 in 
the 1990s.4 There are at least two disputed 
issues with regard to these application lev-
els. The first is how the surpluses affect the 
development of potentially plant available 
soil phosphorus, which is crucial to crop 
growth. In Finland, soil phosphorus is ap-
proximated by the ammonium acid acetate 
method developed by Vuorinen and Mäki-
tie (1955).5 The second is what the crop re-
sponse to phosphorus fertilization and soil 
phosphorus is.
In their long-term field trials, Saarela et al. 
(2004) analyzed crop yields and STP (soil 
test phosphorus) development as followed 
by varying phosphorus application rates 
and initial STP levels. According to their 
results, maintaining an initial STP level of 
12 mg l-1 would require an annual phos-
phorus surplus of about 9 kg ha-1.6 Accord-
ing to estimates of Ekholm et al. (2005) on 
identical soils, on the other hand, main-
taining an STP level of 12 mg l-1 would 
require an annual surplus of 16.6 kg ha-1 
– a radically different result. What the two 
estimates have in common is the implica-
tion that maintaining the STP at a given 
4 The surplus is defined as the difference between 
the average annual phosphorus fertilization and crop 
uptake
5 The result of this soil phosphorus test will be ab-
breviated hereinafter as STP.
6 Note that 9 kg ha-1 denotes the phosphorus sur-
plus, not the amount of phosphorus applied. With 
an annual phosphorus uptake of, say, 10 kg ha-1, 
maintaining the STP level unaltered would require 
phosphorus fertilization of 19 kg ha-1.18  MTT SCIENCE 13
level requires a clear phosphorus surplus. 
One reason for this is that phosphorus 
bonds become stronger with time (Kaila 
1963b). Another, straightforward reason 
is that some of the phosphorus is inevita-
bly lost from the system in runoff.
The potentially plant available phosphorus 
in soil is generally more important for crop 
growth than the annually applied phos-
phorus. In Finnish practice, however, the 
recommendations for phosphorus use are 
based on the fertilizer’s immediate effect on 
crop yields (see, e.g. Valkama et al. 2009). 
As shown in the opening section, omitting 
the transition dynamics of soil phosphorus 
results in false phosphorus application rec-
ommendations. Saarela et al. (1995) dis-
cuss optimal phosphorus use with varying 
STP levels and input and output prices. 
Their analysis accounts for the develop-
ment of STP heuristically by discussing 
the long-term economic effects of altering 
the STP level – and thereby future profits. 
To date, the optimal choice of phospho-
rus has not been presented as a problem of 
controlling the development of soil phos-
phorus – a problem entailing a decision 
between the interdependent processes of 
crop growth and phosphorus losses. Valka-
ma et al. (2009), for instance, recommend 
heavy reductions in overall phosphorus fer-
tilization levels based on crop response to 
phosphorus fertilization. As the quality of 
surface waters is an extremely relevant is-
sue in the Finnish political debate, and the 
role of agriculture is central to that issue, 
it would be important to have a common 
framework for analyzing the optimal use 
of phosphorus. 
Phosphorus and  3.2 
environmental regulation
Finland is one of the few countries that 
have actually implemented a tax on fertili-
zation (Rougoor et al. 2001). The tax, in-
troduced in 1976, was mainly levied for 
fiscal purposes, but was also designed to 
decrease the use of fertilization and thereby 
reduce overproduction (Sumelius 1994). 
The tax was adjusted several times until 
1994, when it was abolished upon Fin-
land’s joining the European Union (EU). 
In 1989, for instance, a law was enacted 
that introduced a special phosphorus tax 
on fertilizers containing more than two 
percent phosphorus. The tax was to be val-
id for the year 1990 only. The tax rate was 
set at 0.5 FIM per kilogram of phospho-
rus (about 0.08 €) from January to mid-
June, and one FIM (about 0.17 €) until the 
end of the year (Laki fosforilannoiteveros-
ta 1989). In 1990, a similar law was enact-
ed that set the tax rate to one FIM from 
January to mid-June, and 1.5 FIM (about 
0.25 €) until the end of the year (Laki fos-
forilannoiteverosta 1990). In 1991, the law 
on phosphorus tax was repealed. Howev-
er, the phosphorus tax was included in a 
law on fertilizer taxes (Laki lannoiteveros-
ta annetun lain muuttamisesta 1991). The 
tax rate was set to 1.7 FIM (about 0.28 €) 
per kilogram of phosphorus. In light of 
the minor crop response to phosphorus 
fertilization as compared to the response 
to accumulated soil phosphorus, it seems 
obvious that a tax rate with such myopic 
fluctuations would not have the desired  – 
or any – effects on phosphorus losses from 
agriculture.
Phosphorus regulation changed dramati-
cally when Finland joined the EU and its 
common agricultural policy. The regula-
tion was set out in the subsequent envi-
ronmental programs (1995–1999, 2000–
2006 and 2007–2013), which essentially 
applied three ways to mitigate phospho-
rus losses: 1) constraints on mineral fer-
tilizers, 2) constraints on the use of ma-
nure, and 3) special subsidies for various 
measures to mitigate phosphorus losses. 
To be eligible for an environmental sub-
sidy, a farmer has to fulfill certain con-
ditions regarding environmentally sound 
production, which include the three con-
straints mentioned above. In addition, the 
programs grant special subsidies for meas-  MTT SCIENCE 13   19
ures such as constructing artificial wet-
lands.  Palva et al. (2001) and Mattila et 
al. (2007) have assessed the effects of agri-
environmental regulation on water pollu-
tion during the periods 1995–1999 and 
2003–2005, respectively. To our knowl-
edge, however, there has been no compre-
hensive assessment focusing specifically on 
phosphorus regulation during the program 
periods.
Summaries and main results   4 
of the studies
ticulate phosphorus lost with eroded soil 
particles. As susceptibility to erosion var-
ies greatly between field parcels, efforts to 
control erosion should vary accordingly. 
The model simultaneously solves for the 
optimal steady-state levels of phosphorus 
fertilization and the intensity of erosion 
control measures when susceptibility var-
ies. Vegetative filter strips are used as a rep-
resentative measure.
The paper solves the privately and social-
ly optimal use of phosphorus and the de-
sirability of constructing vegetative filter 
strips. It also examines optimal Pigouvi-
an taxes that would incentivize the pri-
vate farmer to undertake socially optimal 
actions. In particular, the paper compares 
two alternative variables that can be used 
as determinants of the tax: The tax may be 
imposed on either soil phosphorus or an-
nual phosphorus fertilization. It is shown 
that the tax can be imposed equally well 
on either variable; the outcomes are iden-
tical. Interestingly, however, differences in 
outcomes emerge if there are information 
problems affecting the  parameterization of 
the transition function. If the social plan-
ner fails to estimate the parameters of the 
transition function correctly, only the tax 
imposed on soil phosphorus provides the 
desired outcome in terms of the target lev-
el of phosphorus runoff. 
T
his thesis consists of three studies, 
each analyzing optimal phospho-
rus use from different perspectives. 
The following sections provide brief sum-
maries of the research. Each article is an 
independent entity and includes a brief, 
focused literature review. Accordingly, the 
summaries do not provide references to the 
relevant literature, although some referenc-
es are given for narrative purposes, particu-
larly in the case of the third article. 
Iho, A. Spatially optimal  4.1 
steady-state phosphorus 
policies in crop production
The first study establishes the basic frame-
work informing the research for the thesis. 
It postulates that the use of phosphorus is 
a dynamic programming problem that af-
fects private profits and phosphorus run-
off by gradually adjusting the level of soil 
phosphorus. Hence, optimal use is deter-
mined by not only the input and output 
prices and the production function, but 
also the transition process of soil phospho-
rus. This approach is particularly appeal-
ing, as the runoff of dissolved phosphorus 
– which is readily bioavailable and may 
thus contribute to eutrophication direct-
ly – can be largely explained by soil phos-
phorus concentrations.
The model elaborated in the study includes 
a spatial element to account for the par-20  MTT SCIENCE 13
The study also presents a rather peculiar 
result regarding privately and socially op-
timal steady-state phosphorus levels. If the 
social planner applies a lower discount rate 
than the private farmer, the optimal solu-
tions of the two decision makers get closer 
to each other. In fact,  the research dem-
onstrates that there is a threshold level in 
the difference between the discount rates 
applied after which the private optimum 
produces a lower annual load of dissolved 
phosphorus than the social optimum.7
The results have three key policy implica-
tions. Firstly, the social planner could im-
pose the regulation directly on soil phos-
phorus levels. Controlling the actual use 
of fertilizers serves the environment only 
by controlling the level of soil phospho-
rus. Therefore, if aiming for a particu-
lar dissolved phosphorus load, the regu-
lator could ignore the transition process 
and control soil phosphorus directly. Of 
course, there are informational constraints 
in observing the level of soil phosphorus. 
However, as the key determinant of phos-
phorus load is soil phosphorus, the same 
constraints exist when regulating the use 
of fertilizers. Secondly, the results recom-
mend heavy differentiation of erosion con-
trol measures. As intuition would suggest, 
they should be used on fields most suscep-
tible to erosion. Thirdly, the social planner 
should be careful in setting the abatement 
targets for cereal production areas: He or 
she should first determine the desired lev-
el of production of both crops and pol-
lution. If (projected) pollution levels are 
above those desired, one should restrict 
the use of phosphorus. However, the great-
er impatience of farmers may have result-
ed in phosphorus application levels below 
the social optimum. In this case, increas-
ing the use of fertilization would improve 
welfare.
What the study does not analyze is how 
the results would change if we were to ex-
amine the entire path from various initial 
soil phosphorus levels towards the social-
ly optimal steady state. The parameteriza-
tion of the transition function shows that 
the transition process is very slow in both 
directions. The second study in the thesis 
analyzes how this affects the optimal use 
of phosphorus. 
Iho, A. and Laukkanen,  4.2 
M. Precision phosphorus 
management and 
agricultural phosphorus 
loading
The second study focuses on optimal paths 
of phosphorus use as a function of prevail-
ing soil phosphorus levels. It departs from 
steady-state analysis and poses the follow-
ing questions: What are the optimal phos-
phorus application levels if we are not at 
the steady state? How fast are high (low) 
soil phosphorus levels optimally deplet-
ed (accumulated)? How do the paths of 
the private farmer and the social planner 
differ, and what are the welfare implica-
tions of altering the private decision mak-
er’s behavior? 
As the loss of dissolved, readily algal avail-
able phosphorus is directly linked to the 
level of soil phosphorus, it is of utmost 
importance to analyze how field parcels 
with unnecessarily high soil phosphorus 
levels should be depleted. There are two 
main reasons why high soil phosphorus 
areas emerge in the first place. Firstly, ani-
mal husbandry tends to accumulate phos-
phorus particularly on parcels close to the 
farm center, as modeled by Schnitkey and 
Miranda (1993). Secondly, certain crops 
require a very high soil phosphorus sta-
tus, examples being sugar beet and potato. 
At the European Union level, the acreag-
es of sugar beet have been declining dra-
matically in recent years (Eurostat 2009). 
It would be important to know the op-
timal way to deplete the soil phosphorus 
7 The third study presents oddities of steady-state so-
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from such fields. A comprehensive strate-
gy to this end would examine how sensi-
tive the optimal fertilization policy is to the 
prevailing phosphorus status, how long it 
takes to deplete or accumulate soil phos-
phorus, and what the implications of this 
are for total phosphorus losses.
The study first approximates the value func-
tion numerically and thereafter the optimal 
policy functions for phosphorus applica-
tions and vegetative filter strip use, both as 
functions of soil phosphorus. It also simu-
lates optimal time paths and compares the 
welfare effects of alternative policies.
The research produced three main results. 
Firstly, it demonstrates how strongly the 
use of phosphorus is differentiated in terms 
of soil phosphorus. Secondly, it reveals how 
slight the effect of soil phosphorus is on 
the optimal use of VFSs (vegetative filter 
strips). Thirdly, and most importantly, it 
shows that the higher the initial soil phos-
phorus levels are, the closer the optimal de-
pletion paths of the private agent and the 
social planner get to each other. In other 
words, the results suggest that when the in-
itial reason for sustaining high soil phos-
phorus disappears (e.g., if the crop plant-
ed changes from sugar beet to grain or if 
a technical innovation is found that sub-
stantially decreases the hauling costs of ma-
nure), it may not be worthwhile to actively 
regulate the depletion process. For the first 
few decades, the depletion paths virtually 
coincide, even though the private farmer 
would not take environmental damage into 
account in his/her optimization problem.
The results suggest that farmer extension 
might be a good way to sustain the social-
ly optimal depletion processes. As the soil 
phosphorus transition processes are com-
plicated and perhaps not well known to 
farmers, it might be enough to simply ed-
ucate them to maximize their own profits 
through informed use of phosphorus. 
The study also indicates that promoting 
precision agriculture might be a promis-
ing way to restrain phosphorus loads. The 
term “precision agriculture” refers to agri-
cultural practices which are strongly differ-
entiated by parcel and even within a sin-
gle parcel. One implication of the findings 
here is that it might be worthwhile to in-
vest in technology that allows the farmer 
to carefully trace the soil phosphorus lev-
els in his/her fields. One solution in this 
regard might be to subsidize the necessary 
technology.
Iho, A. and Kitti, M.   4.3 
A tail-payoff puzzle in 
dynamic pollution control
Whereas the first two studies applied ex-
isting methodologies to analyze phospho-
rus  regulation  in  crop  production,  the 
third article is a comment on the meth-
odology itself. It presents a puzzle related 
to the dynamic programming framework, 
one detectable in its standard steady-state 
solution.
The research draws on and contributes to 
the dynamic pollution control literature. 
This branch of literature is mostly con-
cerned with stock character of pollution 
and its implications for dynamically op-
timal policies. A seminal article is Keeler 
et al. (1971), who use a simple macroeco-
nomic model to examine how the co-exist-
ence of an accumulating pollutant changes 
the social welfare at the steady state. A pol-
icy taking the pollutant into account leads 
to “golden age equilibrium”, whereas a pol-
icy ignoring the pollutant leads to “murky 
age equilibrium”. As expected, the social 
welfare associated with the former is high-
er. However, the authors note:  “In other 
situations this ordering could be reversed”. 
They thus suggest that the steady-state out-
comes of socially optimal policies might be 
outperformed socially by privately optimal 
policies. However, they do not discuss the 
issue any further.22  MTT SCIENCE 13
We present and formalize a similar phe-
nomenon, which we call the tail-payoff 
puzzle. It refers to a situation where the 
socially optimal steady-state solution is as-
sociated with lower social welfare than the 
privately optimal steady state solution. This 
can happen if the environmental damage is 
due to accumulated capital that also gener-
ates private profits. This is exactly the same 
case as those investigated in studies one 
and two, where soil phosphorus was the 
(main) source of private benefits and envi-
ronmental damage.  In the numerical ap-
plication, we use the example of control-
ling the loading of dissolved phosphorus 
from agriculture.
In part, the phenomenon is related to the 
literature on intergenerational welfare. The 
fact that discounting treats different gen-
erations unequally has given rise to other 
welfare criteria for assessing policies that af-
fect the welfare of many generations (see, 
e.g. Chichilnisky (1996) and Asheim et 
al. (2001)). There are various rules on re-
source use to satisfy given criteria. For in-
stance, a constant per capita consumption 
consistent with Rawls’s maximin criterion 
can be achieved by keeping the level of in-
vestments equal to rents from exhaustible 
resource depletion (Hartwick 1977; Rawls 
1971; Solow 1974). 
The main contribution of the article is to 
elucidate a little-studied topic in the lit-
erature on intergenerational welfare. The 
tail-payoff puzzle suggests that alternative 
criteria for welfare maximization might be 
required even in a very simple model of 
pollution. The puzzle is presented in the 
context of flow pollution, but it is straight-
forward to show that it does not disappear 
if we allow the pollutant to have a stock 
character. However, investigating a pollut-
ant with a stock character would affect the 
limits of discount rates beyond those which 
the puzzle covers. The necessary condition 
for the puzzle to occur is that pollution be 
generated (at least to some extent) directly 
from the accumulated capital. 
Discussion and Conclusions 5 
P
hosphorus is a major cause of eu-
trophication in most inland waters 
and also in many marine watersheds. 
Often, agriculture is a key anthropogenic 
source of external nutrient loads. In addi-
tion to the complications common to reg-
ulation of any type of nonpoint pollution, 
there are features specific to phosphorus 
loss that make it an especially challeng-
ing phenomenon. Despite the compelling 
need, the agri-environmental literature has 
produced few applications regulating phos-
phorus losses from agriculture. This the-
sis is an effort to shed light on the salient 
characteristics of phosphorus in this re-
gard, and on their implications for opti-
mal regulation of phosphorus losses from 
agriculture.
All the complexities of nonpoint pollution 
are present in the case of controlling phos-
phorus loads from agriculture. To keep the 
analysis tractable and focused on the char-
acteristics of phosphorus, the three compo-
nent studies of the thesis examine a world 
under certainty and complete information. 
This said, the first two essays also discuss 
the implications for regulation in a world 
of uncertainty.
The main contribution of the thesis is a 
transparent and clear-cut dynamic frame-  MTT SCIENCE 13   23
work for analyzing phosphorus loads from 
crop production. Here, the distinction be-
tween dissolved and particulate forms of 
phosphorus is essential, for the differences 
in their role in any environmental damage 
are substantial. It is evident that, keeping 
the acreage under agricultural production 
fixed, the abatement of dissolved phospho-
rus can be mainly accomplished by alter-
ing the level of potentially plant available 
soil phosphorus reserves accumulated in 
the soil. This process is very slow. There-
fore, in many areas it may be impossible to 
achieve fast reductions in phosphorus loss-
es from agriculture.
The three main implications of the thesis 
for the regulation of phosphorus losses are: 
1) The focus of regulation should be on soil 
phosphorus instead of annual phosphorus 
applications, 2) there is a strong depend-
ence between the optimal phosphorus ap-
plication and the current soil phosphorus 
level, and 3) there is a strong dependence 
of erosion control measures on erosion 
susceptibility and the opportunity costs 
of land, and a weak dependence on soil 
phosphorus levels. The results of study two 
suggest that where depletion of excessively 
high phosphorus soils is concerned, preci-
sion agriculture might prove to be socially 
beneficial. The higher the initial soil phos-
phorus levels, the closer the socially and 
privately optimal depletion paths become. 
Of course, if the root cause of excessively 
high soil phosphorus levels is not eliminat-
ed, the privately and socially optimal solu-
tions will differ markedly. This might be 
the case in, say, regulating the use of ma-
nure from animal husbandry.
The issues examined in the third study raise 
questions on the appropriate foundations 
for analyzing environmental pollution gen-
erated by accumulated production capi-
tal. The tail-payoff puzzle detected suggests 
that socially optimal policies based on dis-
counting the net benefits of production 
lead to equilibrium outcomes inconsistent 
with the applied social benefit function. 
The implications of this finding for policy 
design are not completely clear. The first 
study showed that the higher impatience 
of the private farmer may lead to smaller 
amounts of accumulated, polluting pro-
duction capital and therefore to a socially 
optimal outcome even without regulation. 
The third article showed that evaluating 
the steady-state outcomes with a per peri-
od social welfare function may prove that 
the privately optimal steady state solution 
is socially preferable to the socially opti-
mal solution. 
There are numerous ways to extend the 
analyses  conducted.  The  most  obvious 
would be to include uncertainty in crop 
yields, input and output prices and en-
vironmental effects and to acknowledg-
ing the stock effects of phosphorus pollu-
tion. Two less obvious ones would be to 
apply soil phosphorus heterogeneity in the 
context of precision agriculture. Is there 
money on the table in crop production 
on parcels with on average appropriate soil 
phosphorus levels? Put differently, what is 
the threshold level of spatial heterogene-
ity in accumulated soil phosphorus that 
makes it socially worthwhile for the farm-
er to engage in targeted input use? What 
kind of instruments would be needed to 
incentivize farmers to make the needed 
investments?
Another line of research would be to in-
tegrate the dynamic framework used here 
with the framework for optimal manure 
and mineral fertilizer applications elabo-
rated by Schnitkey and Miranda (1993). 
There are various kinds of investments that 
alter their setting, for instance, those that 
decrease hauling costs (e.g., removing wa-
ter from manure) and those that increase 
the number of midpoints for the critical 
radius of manure application (e.g., stor-
ing manure in multiple locations). Ana-
lyzing the social profitability of these in-
vestments would require a framework that 
describes the time paths of soil phospho-
rus and hence pollution loads.24  MTT SCIENCE 13
Certain reservations are in order as regards 
the seemingly exact numerical results in 
any of the studies. The parameterizations of 
the crop response and the transition func-
tions are vitally important in determining 
the absolute amounts of dynamically op-
timal phosphorus use. Both parameteri-
zations originate from a single empirical 
study (Saarela et al. 1995). It would be im-
portant to have alternative formulations to 
test the robustness of the results with re-
gard to these key elements. Moreover, the 
phosphorus abatement functions of vege-
tative filter strips are optimistic at the very 
least. One should consider them a repre-
sentative measure of erosion control soon-
er than realistic descriptions of actual fil-
ter strip abatement. The main results of the 
analyses, however, are robust regardless of 
these parameterizations.  MTT SCIENCE 13   25
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